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ABSTRACT 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a focal point of empirical research and government 
policies. Developing nations are becoming increasingly reliant on international capital flows 
in the form of FDI. This is because FDI can create positive externalities that lead to higher 
rates of growth.  In addition, FDI is a form of long-term investment that is able to withstand 
crises more effectively. The increased democratization of least developed nations infers that 
the relationship between democracy and FDI needs to be empirically established. I utilize the 
Democracy and Dictatorship dataset to empirically estimate the effect of democracy on FDI 
(inflows and as % of GDP) in a dynamic panel data model. Specifically, I utilize generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimators. Accounting for endogeneity, I find evidence that 
there is no relationship between democracy and FDI. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, developing economies were able to absorb more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
than developed countries for the first time. In fact, the least developed economies accounted 
for nearly 52 percent of global FDI flows. Developing nations are becoming more prevailing 
targets for FDI inflows. For instance, out of the top twenty host economies for FDI in 2012, 
nine are categorized as developing nations (UNCTAD, 2013). The historical trends of FDI to 
developing nations, along with increased democratization worldwide, necessitate further 
empirical research on the relationship between FDI and democracy. Political institutions and 
governance may possibly impact inflows of FDI. Governments are placing additional 
emphasis on policies that create favorable investment climates for foreign investors. There is 
a best case scenario in which increased democratization can lead to higher levels of FDI 
inflows. However, it is impossible to ignore the possibility of a negative relationship between 
democracy and FDI. Such correlation would imply a trade-off between pursuing foreign 
capital and granting political rights to citizens of developing nations. After accounting for 
reverse causality between democracy and FDI, I find that there is actually no empirical 
evidence to support claims that link regime types and FDI. 
Within the past decade, many developing nations have competed for capital, internationally. 
During the same time period, we’ve seen an abundance of empirical work dedicated to 
examining the role of foreign capital inflows on developing economies. Convincingly, the 
growth literature thoroughly dissects the channels by which foreign capital can create positive 
externalities in the host economy (Borensztein et al., 1998; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; 
Haskel et al., 2007; Javorcik, 2004; Keller and Yeaple, 2003; Markusen and Venables, 1998). 
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FDI is a long-term investment. It is mobile ex ante and illiquid ex post. In other words, it is 
mobile because of the risk associated with it, but once an FDI project has begun, it is very 
costly to divest. Consequently, FDI can play a key role for economies since it is more capable 
of withstanding economic crises. The fact that it is a long-term investment also indicates that 
firms must undertake a substantial amount of risk in their choice of locale (Borenzstein et al., 
1998).  Determinants of FDI have been extensively studied (Blonigen, 2005; Helpman, 2006; 
Noorbakhsh et al., 2001; Moran, 1998; Moosa, 2002; Balasubramanyam, 1996). Some of 
those factors are country-specific attributes such as market openness, market size, 
development, abundance of labor force, macroeconomic stability, etc.  
In this paper, I empirically estimate the effect of democracy on FDI. Moreover, I employ a 
dynamic model of democracy and FDI. Furthermore, I utilize Cheibub et al.’s (2009) 
Democracy-Dictatorship dataset. This is because they provide a minimalist approach to 
regime classification. They claim that their measure is generalizable and interpretable, unlike 
common subjective measures of regimes. Mainly, I contend that in order to properly estimate 
the correlation between FDI and regime type, it is imperative that the model accounts for 
endogeneity. For instance, while political regime may influence FDI inflows, it is also 
possible that more investment activity could lead to changes in regime type. I employ a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data model to account for those 
issues. My results indicate that after controlling for various country specific factors, 
controlling for previous realizations of FDI inflows, and more importantly, accounting for 
endogeneity, there is no significant evidence to support claims that democracy influences 
FDI.  
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FDI SPILLOVER EFFECTS 
Technology and Knowledge Externalities 
The least developed economies, in theory, should experience a catch-up effect in the level of 
technological advancement (Weil and Galor, 2000; Basu and Weil, 1998; Mankiw et al., 
1992). As evidenced in the growth literature, technology and productivity are the long-run 
determinants of GDP growth rates. Consequently, the gap between developed and developing 
nations is best explained by differences in technological progress. A catch-up effect should 
result since developing nations face lower costs of copying to be able to innovate. FDI 
directly influences this channel by spreading the knowledge base around the world in the form 
of capital investment, therefore speeding up the rate at which developing nations converge to 
developed nations. Studies have argued that FDI is an effective tool to spread knowledge, and 
technology across countries (Borenzstein et al., 1998; Javorcik, 2004). The effect of FDI on 
growth explains the significance of FDI from a policy standpoint.  
Findlay (1978) finds that FDI can increase the rate of technological progress through a 
contagion effect from advanced technology, management practices, etc. He stipulates that 
foreign firms must teach the current workforce their best practices including the usage of their 
equipment. The workers then benefit from the added skillset resulting in higher levels of 
human capital stock. The channels by which FDI can influence technology are through the 
transmission of new ideas and new technologies. Borensztein et al. (1998) develop an 
endogenous growth formula in which technological progress is the key determinant of long 
run growth rates of income per capita. Their results suggest that FDI is an important vehicle 
from which growth can occur in larger measure than previously thought, especially relative to 
domestic investment.  
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Impact on Domestic Industries  
The technological externalities, knowledge spillovers, and demonstration effects for the 
economy have a positive impact on domestic firm’s total factor productivity and on their 
propensity to export (Keller and Yeaple, 2003). The arrival of an FDI project changes supply 
and demand in a number of related industries. An FDI project may create additional 
competition and possibly damage the local industry. However, studies have found that while 
one sector might experience more competition, there are benefits to other firms in other 
sectors (Javorcik, 2004). 
The added demand for inputs for the production of goods and services strengthens supply 
industries, which in turn feed to local firms. Local firms experience lower costs and higher 
profits. The linkage effect allows intermediate good producers to lower cost from increased 
competition, and benefit from improved product quality. Instead of displacing local firms, 
FDI can create complementarities which, in turn, benefit the domestic final goods producers 
in an economy. Markusen and Venables (1999) test the relative strength of these linkages and 
they find that in scenarios in which the initial equilibrium has no local production then 
multinational entry can actually push the economy over to a new equilibrium with some level 
of local production in the intermediate market and final goods market.  
Another channel by which externalities occur as a result of FDI projects is the presence of 
backward linkages. Backward linkages allow domestic industry to flourish by expanding local 
production in both the intermediate and final goods market. Eventually, studies have found 
that these linkages become as strong as to drive the multinational firms out of the economy. 
Hobday (1995) finds that in the computer parts industry, initial FDI created demand for local 
suppliers in Taiwan and improved their product quality, productivity, and product diversity. 
Foreign Direct Investment and Democracy 
Senior Capstone Project for Dario Castro 
- 6 - 
Hundreds of local firms entered the intermediate good market to supply components or 
assembly services to MNCs. Growth of these component and intermediate good markets 
created forward linkage effect to the final goods producers, drawing in more investment by 
MNCs and domestic firms. Eventually, it was found that these domestic final goods producers 
were able to displace the multinationals over time as they became more efficient from the 
presence of backward linkages with suppliers. Javorcik (2004) supports this argument, stating 
that spillover channels from FDI improve efficiency by copying technologies of foreign 
affiliates operating in the local market either through observation or by hiring workers trained 
by the affiliates. The argument can be made that backward linkages can lead to direct 
knowledge transfers from foreign customers to local suppliers. Backward linkages also 
increases demand for better product quality and on-time delivery. Consequently, firms are 
incentivized to improve efficiency and innovation. Lastly, it increases demand for 
intermediate inputs allowing for economies of scale.  
The positive externalities created by FDI are beneficial to developing economies. The 
realization of their importance has led to institutional policies that encourage the entry of 
foreign capital into a host economy. Despite backlash from domestic producers and the 
workforce that it temporarily displaces, governments are now competing to make their locales 
a relatively favorable investment climate for foreigners.  
DETERMINANTS OF FIRM INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
Dunning (1991) proposes a framework that guides the decision making process by which a 
firm chooses to invest internationally. The OLI paradigm focuses on transaction cost 
economics, trade and location theory, and industrial organization approaches. Dunning (1991) 
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argues that operating overseas must have some perceived advantages in order for it to take 
place. The main driving forces can be broken down in three parts.  
First, ownership-advantages include the ownership of intangible assets and common 
governance of cross-border production. Some examples are product innovations, management 
practices, marketing techniques, and brand names. Additionally, ownership-advantages allow 
the firm to exploit economies of scale and develop monopoly power. The need to monopolize 
implies that property rights protection is more important to firms looking for these advantages 
(Dunning, 1991; Dunning, 1993). 
Second, firms can obtain internalization advantages by seeking control of cross-border 
production. Firms can take direct control of their value-added activities in multiple countries 
instead of using other strategic entrances into the market via outsourcing, trade, or licensing. 
Internalizing may be beneficial if there is risk of opportunism by foreign buyers and sellers. It 
may also lead to other market failures such as the violation of property rights in high 
technology industries. Consequently, firms may have substantial incentives to internalize 
production to minimize the risk of leakages. These advantages are affected by antitrust or 
competition oriented regulation in the host country (Dunning, 1991; Dunning, 1993).  
Lastly, location specific advantages can be perceived by firms in terms of their economic 
environment or government policies. Some examples are the presence of key raw inputs, 
abundant labor, high economic development, favorable macroeconomic policies, and other 
FDI specific government policies (Dunning, 1991; Dunning, 1993). Overall, firms ultimately 
decide to invest if there is a perceived benefit. Tangible benefits can be readily measured such 
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as profits and return on investment. Dunning (1991; 1993) establishes a framework by which 
government policies can impact the competitiveness of foreign investors. 
ESTABLISHING CAUSALITY BETWEEN POLITICAL REGIME AND FDI 
Since location-specific advantages may have a positive or negative effect on the induction of 
FDI inflows, then governments have a substantial amount of power in how they manage FDI 
policies. Governments may limit the advantages of seeking FDI or adopt protectionist policy 
that shields domestic firms from foreign entry. Some of these limitations include screenings 
and geographical restrictions (UNCTAD, 2013). Expecting several spillovers outlined earlier, 
governments may attempt to reign in investment by offering financial and fiscal incentives. 
Governments can strengthen the competitiveness of the foreign investor, and investors must 
also rely on policies to continue to sustain advantages. The potential for having a good and a 
bad investment climate depends on whether there is a correlation between political regime 
type and FDI.  
Democratic countries have specific characteristics such as the presence of checks and 
balances and veto players (Jensen, 2003). Furthermore, democratic leaders must be voted into 
office by the electorate. The differences between a democratic leader and an autocratic leader 
therefore comes down the process in which they come to power, the method by which they 
sustain the power, and also how much flexibility they have for policy making purposes. 
Trade Off Between Political Rights and FDI Inflows 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was growing a sentiment that globalization 
exploited the economically and politically repressed. Multinationals have been heavily 
accused of having complete disregard for civil society’s rights. According to Amnesty 
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International (2002), there is evidence that United Fruit backed a government overthrow in 
Guatemala. Also, that ITT had a contributing role in the overthrow of the elected Allende 
government in Chile, and that international extractive industries supported authoritarian 
regimes such as Shell Oil in Nigeria, Unocal in Myanmar, and British Pretroleum in 
Colombia. Harms and Ursprung (2002) try to establish a link between political repression and 
FDI inflows. They find that autocracies repress political rights, whereas democracies grant 
political rights to their constituents. It is possible that MNCs may have a special liking for 
autocratic countries. Part of the reason lies in the autocrat’s ability to suppress wages by not 
allowing workers to organize themselves. Profit-maximizing multinationals would benefit 
significantly as they would be able to lower operating costs. As a result, autocracies enact 
efficiency policies by providing a better environment for domestic and foreign investment 
than democratic countries (Huntington and Dominguez, 1975). This is particularly important 
for extractive and manufacturing enterprises that depend heavily on labor costs. 
Multinationals will benefit from that ability and seek to collude with autocratic leaders. Busse 
(2004) finds repressive regimes induced more FDI in the 1970s. Adam and Filippaios (2007) 
find that the presence of political repression also increases the likelihood of having more FDI. 
Haggard (1990) contends that authoritarian rule is attractive to investors in countries with 
traditions of strong pressure from labor. Authoritarian regimes can give political elites 
autonomy from distributionist pressures, allowing for more economic policy options. 
Authoritarian regimes have shown an ability to suppress wages and favor the elite. More 
importantly, they have more flexibility for policy options. These policy options allow 
autocrats to provide favorable FDI policies that the electorate may not necessarily agree with 
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(Li and Resnick, 2003; Jakobsen and De Soysa, 2006; Olson, 1993; Busse, 2004; Clague et 
al., 1996; Busse and Hefeker, 2007). 
Li and Resnick (2003) find that democratic institutions reduce FDI inflows. They explain that 
the negative relationship is due to the fact that democratic institutions have incentives to 
develop public policies that reflect popular sentiment. The popular sentiment may include a 
diverse set of opinions which may impact electoral and public policy making outcomes. 
Popular sentiment then constraints the executive power in democratic institutions. For 
instance, if there is a strong sentiment in a country that the entrance of foreign capital 
displaces the labor force in a domestic industry, or causes domestic industries to face 
increased competition, then the electorate may not support a democratic leader that enacts 
policies to increase inward FDI. In contrast, autocratic politics is biased in favor of narrow 
elite control, meaning that they have more executive power to enact policies that may benefit 
multinationals. MNCs operate in markets in which they are typically the dominant firm. They 
have substantial market power to try to monopolize. They can obtain more market share by 
colluding with autocratic governments. Moreover, the likelihood of bribery and corruption is 
more likely to take place in an autocratic country, because freedom of expression and open 
media in democratic countries bring about a more transparent political system. Additionally, 
the autocrat’s primary focus is to generate more revenues for the ruling elite. Rulers will 
tolerate imperfect competition and concentrated market power of the monopolistic and 
oligopolistic foreign firms. 
Autocratic leaders ultimately benefit from being able to enact policies without popular 
support. Some examples of such policy making are the ability to provide fiscal and financial 
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incentives to foreign investors with relative ease. For example, they can provide tax holidays, 
exemptions from import duties, deductions from social security contributions, accelerated 
depreciation allowances, investment grants, subsidized loans, and wage subsidies. These 
incentives are more likely to be granted in autocratic states because a democratic government 
is constrained by the time that it takes to coordinate domestic interests to the idea of providing 
a generous incentive to foreign capital (Li and Resnick, 2003). There might be a significant 
electoral backlash. Local business owners and the unemployed are likely to organize and 
lobby for protective industrial policy from the government.  
Democracy Complements FDI 
While autocracies provide benefits of shielding MNCs from redistribution, there are costs 
associated with increased risk of policy reversals by the autocrat’s own distributional 
interests. In order words, multinationals cannot count on the autocrat’s potential for sudden 
policy reversal as a result of his own personal interests. Accordingly, a lack of credibility is 
prevalent in autocratic regimes. Autocrats are argued to be short-sighted relative to the 
average citizen who has a longer time horizon. Political risks are minimized in a democratic 
system since it possesses checks and balances that prevent immediate policy reversal (Jensen, 
2003). Olson (1993; 1996) look into which effect has more weight and finds that individual 
freedom attracts more FDI. This finding is also in line with Harms and Ursprung (2002). 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002), who utilize the Kaufmann et al. (1999) measure of 
governance infrastructure, suggest that governance infrastructure attracts capital but also 
creates conditions under which domestic MNCs emerge and invest abroad. They conclude 
that positive governance infrastructure includes an impartial and transparent legal system that 
protects property rights and individual rights. Public institutions must be stable, credible, and 
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honest. This hints at the possibility that democratic states, which tend to be more stable and 
credible than autocratic ones, would benefit from increased FDI inflows (Jensen, 2003; Li and 
Resnick, 2003; Yang, 2007; Milner and Kubota, 2005; Rodrik, 1996). 
Jensen (2003) contends that democratic governments attract as much as 70 percent more FDI 
as a percentage of GDP than their authoritarian counterparts. Autocratic nations increase 
political risk because of fear of expropriation or divestment. Jensen (2002) explains that 
political constraints for democratic regimes allow for higher levels of political stability and 
more favorable policies toward multinationals. Tsebelis (1995) argues that the existence of 
veto players can increase political stability. These policies are more likely to change in 
autocratic countries because the autocrat does not have to go through a system of checks and 
balances. Credibility is derived from the presence of veto players, and checks and balances. 
This is the major contribution that democracy provides. It is able to substantially lower the 
risks of losing assets once a costly FDI project has begun. Li and Resnick (2003) also contend 
that democracies are better at enforcing contracts and have a more transparent legal system. 
Corruption can impose unpredictable costs on firms. Effective rule of law, property rights 
protection, along with codified legal structure and institutionalized access to enforcement 
mechanisms make democracies more attractive by posing less risk. Ultimately, the presence 
of veto players over public policy plays the dominant role in offering a transparent system. 
Additionally, government commitment to market friendly policies in the future can induce 
FDI. Democratic leaders are held accountable for their actions.  Literature on audience costs 
explains that if a democratic leader fails to enact policies that promote stability and growth, 
then they will be replaced in a future election. As a result, democratic leaders are more likely 
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to be held accountable and might possibly enact more FDI seeking policies. Ultimately, a 
democratic leader suffers in terms of electoral votes if he/she does not promote a good 
investment climate. Leadership turnover in democratic systems can be associated with more 
market-friendly policies for MNCs. An example of this effect is the announcement made by 
da Silva of Brazil who belonged to the left-wing Workers’ party which had overtaken 
President Cardoso in 2002. When this occurred, the stock and bond markets tumbled. Cardoso 
stressed that voting da Silva into power would ruin Brazil’s image in the eyes of the 
international financial community. Consequently, Da Silva made pledges to the international 
community on his future policies making assuring that his policies would be market-friendly.  
Recent empirical studies (Jakobsen and de Soysa, 2006; Busse and Hefeker, 2004; Yang, 
2009) find that there is a positive link between democracy and FDI by applying statistical 
methods such as transforming the dependent variable, controlling for innovation, and focusing 
on regime type. Overall, studies are rather inconclusive due to the polarization of perspectives 
and the lack of a general definition of democracy. Additionally, a significant gap exists from 
an empirical standpoint, as many studies have failed to point out the possibility of an 
endogenous relationship between democracy and FDI. I contribute to the literature by 
controlling for endogeneity. Democracy should have an impact on FDI through their policies, 
but it is also possible that FDI projects and multinational presence might also apply political 
pressure and affect regime types. A multinational may in fact shape popular interest via 
advertising campaigns designed to promote globalization. Corporations looking for extractive 
assets such as oil fields, and minerals may influence politics by pushing for regime types, and 
leaders that are more likely to allow them to gain entry to their untapped natural resources. 
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This possible effect of FDI on political regime suggests that endogeneity must be accounted 
for.  
MEASURING AND DEFINING DEMOCRACY 
To empirically test the relationship between FDI and political regime, it was necessary to 
evaluate existing measures of regime type and identify the most appropriate data source. 
Instead of using popular measures such as Polity IV and Freedom House, I utilize the 
Democracy-Dictatorship dataset (Cheibub et al., 2009). Cheibub et al. (2009) analyze the 
differences in regime measures citing their strengths and weaknesses, and suggest that a 
regime classification must be able to address important research questions, be interpreted 
meaningfully and also be reproducible. Along those guidelines, they evaluate existing 
measures of democratization and create their own classification dataset. They contend that 
current popular measures are not interchangeable and that the choice of measure must be 
guided by theoretical and empirical underpinnings. They disagree with the view that the 
measures correlate with each other and question their reliability for robustness checks.  
Subjectivity of Popular Measures 
Popular measures of political regime can be found in the Freedom House (FH) data and the 
Polity IV data. FH focuses on political rights and civil liberties. The coding varies from year 
to year, thereby it may not be particularly helpful for time series analysis. Some of the 
questions that the data attempts to answer are subjective and arbitrary such as: “are there fair 
electoral laws?” “is the vote transparent?” “is there free and independent media?” and “is 
there equality of opportunity?”. These subjective questions could lead to small changes that 
result in misclassification. Polity IV focuses on competitiveness of political participation, 
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regulation of political participation, executive recruitment competition, openness of executive 
recruitment, and constraints on chief executive power. Polity weighs heavily on the executive 
branch constraints, making it appropriate to measure checks and balances but it also includes 
political violence, which complicates the measure. Additionally, the scoring is subjective and 
arbitrary, making it less useful to interpret the results. For instance, a positive change in a 
value from a year at t=0 to year t-1 implies that democracy improved, but it does not 
necessarily imply that the country is democratic. A politically repressed nation may become 
less repressed, but not necessarily more democratic. This makes it hard to evaluate across 
countries and to be able to interpret the results in a meaningful way. Both measures include 
difficult information to obtain and also employ subjective approaches. Such bias makes the 
measures particularly difficult to utilize in robustness checks and also do not allow for proper 
time-series and cross-sectional analysis.  
Democracy-Dictatorship Measure: 
Cheibub et al. (2009) add to the work of Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) 
and create a democracy classification known as the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) dataset. It 
consists of a minimalist dichotomous measure of democracy that focuses on whether elections 
in a country are contested. The classification is binary. A democratic is country is assigned a 
value of “1” at time t. If classified as a dictatorship, it is coded “0”. The rules for the 
classification are as follows: 1) the chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a 
body that was itself popularly elected. 2) The legislative must be popularly elected. 3) There 
must be more than one party competing in the elections and 4) an alternation in power under 
electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken place 
(Cheibub et al., 2009). 
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This dataset finds 728 of the 1457 legislative elections, and 268 of the 489 presidential 
elections that took place from 1946 to 1996 as part of regimes that were classified as a 
dictatorships despite having held elections. Such a minimalist view limits the subjectivity of 
measuring democracy. The rules for classification can easily be observed, and are adjusted for 
the possibility of type II error, that is, any false positives in the data. Anecdotal evidence 
exists in the case of Malaysia from 1957 and 1969 where three multiparty elections took 
place. The incumbent party won an absolute majority in the first two but lost in the third. The 
Malaysian government declared a state of emergency, closed parliament, and rewrote the 
constitution in a way that guaranteed that they would not lose an election after parliament was 
re-opened. This country was classified as a dictatorship despite having held elections. For 
these reasons, the coding is clear and stark. It has less subjectivity and can be reliably used to 
address research questions. It focuses on reliability as opposed to validity (Cheibub et al., 
2009). 
DATA 
I conduct a dynamic panel data analysis to investigate the relationship between FDI and 
democracy. To ensure robustness, I use two measures of FDI; FDI inflows and FDI as % of 
GDP. I examine 180 countries for the time period 1970 to 2008.  The variable FDI inflows is 
defined as the investment necessary to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is calculated as “the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the 
balance of payments (World Bank, 2014).” I follow the literature and transform FDI inflows 
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using natural logarithms in order to reduce skewedness in its distribution (Yang, 2007; Busse, 
2004; Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Jensen, 2003; and Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). My second 
dependent variable is the ratio of FDI to GDP, also collected from the World Bank (Busse, 
2004; Yang, 2007). In addition, I employ various control variables used in previous empirical 
findings such as GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) in constant 2005 international dollars, real 
GDP per capita growth rates, real effective exchange rates, and trade openness measured as 
the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP (Busse, 2004; Li and Resnick, 2003; Jensen, 
2003; Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Yang, 2007; Li, 2009). All 
variables are transformed using natural logarithms. It is important to note that it is a standard 
practice to use logs of real GDP per capita, and exchange rates. Busse (2004) and Busse and 
Hefeker (2007) also apply log transformations to trade openness and real GDP per capita 
growth rates. Thus, my data transformations are consistent with previous studies. Moreover, 
time dummies are also included based on Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Roodman (2006). 
Furthermore, I include a lag of my dependent variables (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Li and 
Resnick, 2003). This is because it is possible that previous realizations of FDI influence 
current realizations, and the relationship may be dynamic.  
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
Model Specification  
The baseline specification takes the following form: 
 
ititiititit uxDemocracyFDIFDI +++= − δβα
'
1
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Where i indexes countries, t indexes time periods, and it-1 indicates a value at t-1. Xi 
represents the vector for other explanatory variables.  The model is first estimated using 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) specification. Pooled OLS is a cross-sectional dimension 
of the data. Specifying the model using OLS poses various problems. Mainly, ignoring a time 
component could significantly bias the results. In the estimation process, the algorithm 
associates observations corresponding to one cross-sectional unit at time t with another cross-
sectional unit at time t+1. For instance, lagged FDI for Brazil in 2008, will be combined with 
lagged FDI for Chile in 1970. This represents a problem because it mixes two cross-sectional 
units that should normally be separated and treated with a cross-sectional dimension and a 
time dimension. To correctly deal with changes over time, I specified the model using fixed 
effects panel OLS. While solving the time dimension issue with the previous model, the 
presence of endogeneity and also lagged dependent variables treated as regressors biases the 
results. More specifically, the OLS estimates would violate fundamental assumptions required 
for efficiency of OLS estimators. For instance, previous realizations of the dependent variable 
may be correlated with the fixed effects in the error term. Also, because of possible 
endogeneity and serial correlation, OLS estimators cannot be used reliably. Instead, I specify 
the model using GMM dynamic panel data technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
This method controls for unobserved country-specific effects as well as endogenous 
explanatory variables and deals with possible serial correlation. I used the two variations of 
the GMM: differences GMM, and system GMM. Importantly, GMM estimators make fewer 
assumptions about the underlying data-generating process and use more complex techniques 
to isolate useful information.  
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Assumptions of GMM Specification 
The assumptions necessary for a GMM model specification are as follows: 1) the estimation 
of FDI may be dynamic, with current realizations of the dependent variable influenced by past 
ones. 2) GMM estimates converge to the true beta coefficient as the sample size goes to 
infinity, implying that is efficient. 3) Some regressors may be endogenous. 4) It is also 
possible that the idiosyncratic disturbances apart from the fixed effects may have individual-
specific patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 5) Some regressors may also be 
predetermined but not strictly exogenous: even if independent of current disturbances, but still 
influenced by past ones. The lagged dependent variable is an example of this. 6) There is no 
perfect instrument waiting in the wings, it assumes that the only available instruments are 
“internal” based on the lags of instrumented variables (Roodman, 2006). 
Differences GMM 
A differences GMM was proposed by Arellano and Bond (1995) which is an addition to the 
GMM first developed by Hansen (1982) and also to Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). The goal of a 
GMM model is to find the true value of the coefficients. In doing so, it does not assume any 
particular shape of the distribution of the data. Differences GMM removes the fixed effect by 
first differencing. First differencing consists of transforming the regressors into differences as 
opposed to levels. Doing so creates variables that are time-invariant. Then, the transformed or 
first-differenced lagged dependent variable (FDI) is instrumented with its past levels. If an 
explanatory variable is suspected of possibly being endogenous, it is instrumented with lags 
of the dependent variable allowing us to control for reverse causality. Dealing with 
endogeneity is unique to this model specification and generates results that are unbiased, as 
opposed to OLS estimators. 
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System GMM 
As Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate, if the dependent variable is close to a random 
walk, then difference GMM performs poorly because past levels convey little information 
about future changes, so untransformed lags are weak instruments for transformed variables. 
In other words, instrumenting with levels is not particularly useful. Blundell and Bond 
develop an approach by transforming the instruments to make them exogenous to the fixed 
effects. In order words, regressors can be time-invariant. For random walk-like variables, past 
changes may indeed be more predictive of current levels than past levels are of current 
changes so that the new instruments are more relevant. In the difference GMM, Arellano-
Bond instruments differences with levels. Instead, Blundell-Bond instruments levels with 
differences. This is known as the system GMM. System GMM combines both equations for 
levels and differences. In doing so, system GMM is thought to be more efficient because it 
allows the use of more instruments.  
Specification Tests 
There are two methods to specify GMM to account for heteroskedasticity. First, I specify the 
model using “one-step” estimation along with robust standard errors. One-step estimation 
includes replacing the variance with a proxy based on one-step residuals. This leads to robust 
standard errors. I additionally specify the model using “two-step” estimation. This 
specification is efficient and robust to whatever patterns of heteroskedasticity and cross 
correlation the estimator models (Roodman, 2006). A drawback of the two-step is that it ends 
up mining the data by overweighing observations that fit the model and under-weighing those 
that contradict it. While it may not result in inconsistent estimates, it does result in spurious 
precision in the form of implausibly small standard errors. To account for the possible 
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overfitting, I utilize the Windmeijer (2005) correction. Windmeijer (2005) corrects standard 
errors to overcome the downward bias present in the two-step estimator; he finds that two-
step GMM performs better than one-step GMM in estimating coefficients, with lower bias 
and standard errors.  
A critical assumption for the validity of the GMM is that the instruments are exogenous. If a 
model is exactly identified, detection of invalid instruments is impossible. The Hansen test for 
overidentifying restrictions tests the validity of the instruments used in the model. The null 
hypothesis is that of joint validity of the instruments. Therefore, failing to reject the null 
would deem the instruments valid. Therefore, Hansen becomes the only relevant measure of 
validity of instruments.  I also perform a difference-in-Sargan/Hansen test, which performs 
estimation with and without a subset of suspect instruments, under the null of joint validity of 
the full instrument set. Ultimately, the Sargan/Hansen test should not be relied upon too 
faithfully, because it is prone to weakness as the number of instruments increases.  
Autocorrelation is a phenomenon that would render some lags invalid as instruments, such as 
autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term. That is, if the lags of the variables are 
correlated with some unobservable effects found in the error term. If the idiosyncratic 
disturbances are serially correlated of order 1, that makes the lagged instruments invalid. This 
would warrant longer lags, however if there is order-2 serial correlation, then even longer lags 
would need to be used. It is important to note that serial correlation of order 1 is expected; 
therefore rejecting the null does not pose a problem. A test for autocorrelation is performed by 
Arellano-Bond later referenced as AR(1) and AR(2) (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 displays the pooled OLS regression estimates. In column 5, the results indicate that 
lagged FDI is statistically significant and positively correlated with FDI inflows. Thus, 
investment activity in a country is an important factor in determining whether more 
investment will take place in the future. Moreover, the results also indicate that democracy is 
not statistically significant. Therefore, I do not find any evidence to suggest that democracy 
impacts FDI. Consequently, democracy has a limited effect on FDI. It is important to note that 
without the presence of exchange rates, democracy becomes statistically significant but 
negatively correlated with FDI (column 4), consistent with Li and Resnick (2003). The same 
is true if trade openness is omitted from the model specification.  
Real GDP per capita is statistically significant at the 1% level and positively correlated with 
FDI. Therefore, OLS regression estimates indicate that economic development will increase 
the flows of capital to a particular country. This is consistent with the growth literature which 
suggests that economic development will lead to higher levels of FDI. Growth prospects are 
also positive and significant but only at the 10% level. If a country is expected to have higher 
growth, then the amount of inward FDI to the country will increase. Surprisingly, I find that 
trade is negative correlated and statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that a 
country that is market friendly is less likely to receive FDI. That is a particularly surprising 
result because the literature has found trade to have positive influences on FDI because 
multinational corporations seek markets that allow them to import and export relatively easier. 
Finally, the exchange rates are also positively correlated and significant at the 10 % level. 
This implies that if the value of the currency of a host country increases relatively to a 
weighted average of other currencies, there will be more inward FDI.  
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As evidenced in Table 2, in column 5, the results are the same when I use an alternate 
dependent variable. There are some differences. For instance, GDP per capita is not 
statistically significant and trade becomes positively correlated. This is not in line with my 
previous results. This implies that a country’s level of development does not have an impact 
on how much foreign investment is coming into the country. It also finds that an economy that 
is more open to trade is more likely to receive FDI. This is now consistent with the previous 
studies. 
Panel fixed effects regression estimates are displayed in Table 3. Overall the results remain 
the same (column 5). Democracy remains not statistically significant. I also find that GDP per 
capita, trade, and the exchange rate are positively correlated and statistically significant. 
However, this model finds that growth prospects do not affect a country’s FDI inflows. 
Moreover, the estimates are able to predict approximately 66 percent of the variance in FDI 
flows over the time period, a significant difference from the 89 percent predicted variance in 
pooled OLS estimates.  
Utilizing the alternate dependent variable, panel fixed effects regression estimates are 
different (Table 4). In column 5, the results show that GDP per capita and the exchange rate 
are not statistically significant. The usage of an alternate dependent variable for panel data 
analysis is not consistent with the results for FDI inflows (Table 3). These results are not 
consistent with previous empirical findings (Jensen, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003). 
The One-step differences GMM regression estimates are displayed in Table 5.  In column 5, 
the results indicate that lagged FDI is statistically significant and positively correlated, thus 
confirming my previous estimates. This model also confirms that growth and the exchange 
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rate are not statistically significant. Mainly the results also provide more evidence that there is 
no relationship between democracy and FDI.  Using two-step differences GMM model, I find 
that lagged FDI is not statistically significant (Table 6).  It still confirms my previous results 
that democracy is not significant. Moreover, it also confirms that growth and the exchange 
rate are not significant.  
Using the alternate dependent variable in Table 7, the results indicate that trade is actually 
statistically significant at the 1% level (column 5). The democracy variable remains not 
statistically significant. In addition, it also confirms that growth and the exchange rate hold no 
impact on FDI as % of GDP. The two-step differences GMM regression estimates corroborate 
these findings (Table 8). 
One-step system GMM regression estimates continued to reveal that democracy is not 
statistically significant (Table 9, column 5). Now, I find that GDP per capita is found not to be 
statistically significant. I also find evidence that the exchange rates are positively correlated 
and statistically significant at the 10% level. It is imperative to document that without the 
presence of all the control variables, democracy is positively and significantly associated with 
FDI. Nevertheless, it is important to control for other determinants of FDI in order to generate 
unbiased regression estimates. The Two-step system GMM regression estimates confirm the 
one-step system GMM regression results (Table 10). The only difference is the variable 
exchange rate which is now not statistically significant. 
In Table 11, I report the one-step system GMM regression results for the alternative 
dependent variable (FDI as % of GDP). In column 5, GDP per capita becomes negatively 
correlated and statistically significant at the 10% level. Also, trade becomes statistically 
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significant and positively correlated which does not coincide with previous system GMM 
regression estimates. The two-step system GMM regression estimates in Table 12 also present 
similar findings. 
Specification tests such the Hansen test, reveals that the instruments are valid by failing to 
reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments. Furthermore, the AR (2) tests shows that the 
model does not suffer from serial correlation. Specification tests reveal that the GMM 
estimators are an appropriate model to study the relationship between FDI and democracy. 
Overall, I provide evidence that lagged FDI is statistically significant and positively 
correlated. Also, I find no evidence to support claims that there is a link between democracy 
and FDI. Additionally, I also find that the effects of growth and the exchange rate on FDI to 
be inconclusive. I also find that FDI inflows and FDI as % of GDP are not interchangeable for 
estimating the relationship between GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth rates, trade, and 
the exchange rate. But, my results consistently show that there is no correlation between 
democracy and FDI for either of the dependent variables. While my findings are consistent 
with Yang (2007), they are not in line with empirical studies by Li and Resnick (2003), 
Jensen (2003), Busse (2004), and Busse and Hefeker (2007).  
CONCLUSION 
After controlling for endogeneity, I do not find evidence to support claims that there is a link 
between FDI and democracy. This does not mean that political institutions do not influence 
FDI. Instead, the results indicate that if a country is democratic it does not impact inward FDI. 
Government policies may still very well affect FDI. Government policies in the form of 
regional FDI consist of agreements between governments which would allow investors from a 
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particular country to gain entry into their market, usually designated geographically and, or by 
sector. An example of this is the recent agreement between Japan and India, which allows 
Japanese investors to participate in special economic zones in India (UNCTAD, 2013). 
Governments may still influence property rights, and other policies that are relevant to FDI. 
Furthermore, I find that the level of development is a significant factor in obtaining more FDI 
flows. The government may decide to allocate resources more efficiently by focusing on 
development policies to acquire more foreign investment.
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APPENDICES 
Table 1 – Pooled OLS Regression Estimates (FDI Inflows) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.8957*** 
(0.0108) 
0.8585*** 
(0.0152) 
0.8680*** 
(0.0188) 
0.8499*** 
(0.0217) 
0.8400*** 
(0.0330) 
Democracy 0.1593*** 
(0.0336) 
0.0213 
(0.0412) 
-0.0509** 
(0.0473) 
-0.1288*** 
(0.0512) 
-0.1162 
(0.0814) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 0.1679*** 
(0.0250) 
0.1575*** 
(0.0296) 
0.2216*** 
(0.0372) 
0.2191*** 
(0.0490) 
GDP Growth   0.0334* 
(0.0206) 
0.0482** 
(0.0214) 
0.0558* 
(0.0307) 
Trade    -0.2312*** 
(0.0395) 
-0.2192** 
(0.0921) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    0.0495* 
(0.0294) 
Constant 1.7270*** 
(0.2545) 
1.1537*** 
(0.2398) 
0.6949*** 
(0.2907) 
1.4840*** 
(0.4272) 
1.9485*** 
(0.7175) 
R-Squared 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.85 
F-Statistic 369.54*** 348.07*** 271.95*** 379.45*** 132.63*** 
Observations 4535 3586 2675 2636 1069 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 2 – Pooled OLS Regression Estimates (FDI % of GDP) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.7554*** 
(0.0179) 
0.7160*** 
(0.0219) 
0.7122*** 
(0.0261) 
0.6512*** 
(0.0261) 
0.6227*** 
(0.0523) 
Democracy 0.7782** 
(0.0313) 
-0.0145 
(0.0377) 
-0.0979** 
(0.0415) 
-0.0551 
(0.0407) 
0.0875 
(0.0661) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 0.0600*** 
(0.0172) 
0.0706*** 
(0.0182) 
0.0437** 
(0.0177) 
0.0091 
(0.0283) 
GDP Growth   0.0514*** 
(0.0188) 
0.0420** 
(0.0188) 
0.0562** 
(0.0277) 
Trade    0.3828*** 
(0.0395) 
0.4726*** 
(0.0664) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    0.0635** 
(0.0283) 
Constant -0.3723* 
(0.1934) 
-0.4866** 
(0.1909) 
-1.0200*** 
(0.2236) 
-2.4401*** 
(0.2699) 
-2.9645*** 
(0.4711) 
R-Squared 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 
F-Statistic 425.32*** 389.21*** 267.43*** 245.19*** 189.01*** 
Observations 4535 3586 2675 2636 1069 
 
 
 
 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 3 – Panel Fixed Effects Regression Estimates (FDI Inflows) 
  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.5273*** 
(0.0261) 
0.4399*** 
(0.0282) 
0.4393*** 
(0.0362) 
0.4138*** 
(0.0358) 
0.3704*** 
(0.0459) 
Democracy -0.0338 
(0.0971) 
0.0911 
(0.1011) 
0.0723 
(0.1165) 
-0.0831 
(0.1070) 
0.0723 
(0.1807) 
GDP Per 
Capita  
0.7730*** 
(0.1538) 
0.6051*** 
(0.1623) 
0.5542*** 
(0.1625) 
0.6933** 
(0.2763) 
GDP Growth 
  0.0361* (0.0214) 
0.0273 
(0.0214) 
0.0151 
(0.0262) 
Trade 
   0.5024*** (0.1202) 
0.5515*** 
(0.1673) 
Exchange 
Rate     
0.0919** 
(0.0408) 
Constant 7.6132*** 
(0.4351) 
3.3522*** 
(1.1284) 
4.5101*** 
(1.1772) 
3.3778*** 
(1.3048) 
3.9881*** 
(2.5098) 
R-Squared 
0.95 0.80 0.85 0.79 0.66 
F-Statistic 
224.82*** 145.87*** 106.79*** 41.26*** 70.11*** 
Observations 
4535 3586 2675 2636 1069 
Groups 
180 172 170 168 88 
 
 ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 4 – Panel Fixed Effects Regression Estimates (FDI % of GDP) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.5016*** 
(0.0108) 
0.4627*** 
(0.0252) 
0.4728*** 
(0.0269) 
0.4381*** 
(0.0268) 
0.3720*** 
(0.0448) 
Democracy -0.0447 
(0.0931) 
0.0755 
(0.1006) 
0.0314 
(0.1105) 
-0.0653 
(0.1061) 
-0.0061 
(0.1878) 
GDP Per 
Capita  
0.1541 
(0.1492) 
-0.0293 
(0.0212) 
-0.1241 
(0.1558) 
-0.1237 
(0.2711) 
GDP Growth 
  0.0279 (0.0212) 
0.0131 
(0.0208) 
0.0120 
(0.0251) 
Trade 
   0.6866*** (0.1206) 
0.7798*** 
(0.1773) 
Exchange 
Rate     
0.0641 
(0.0523) 
Constant -0.3396* 
(0.1953) 
-1.5110 
(1.2439) 
-0.2655 
(1.2711) 
-2.3031* 
(1.4008) 
-1.7358 
(0.2.7149) 
R-Squared 
0.95 0.87 0.92 0.81 0.79 
F-Statistic 
74.01*** 58.37*** 39.43*** 41.26*** 20.24*** 
Observations 
4371 3554 2658 2622 1062 
Groups 
178 171 169 167 87 
 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 5 – One-Step Differences GMM Regression Estimates (FDI Inflows) 
 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.7969*** 
(0.0321) 
0.5048*** 
(0.0878) 
0.4695*** 
(0.0788) 
0.4219*** 
(0.0863) 
0.4132*** 
(0.1531) 
Democracy 0.1876 
(0.5291) 
-0.0010 
(0.4907) 
0.0137 
(0.5482) 
-0.8985 
(0.7403) 
0.7543 
(1.3811) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 2.6456*** 
(0.7298) 
2.6851*** 
(0.8101) 
2.1608*** 
(0.5583) 
1.5690* 
(0.8481) 
Growth   0.3568 
(0.4621) 
0.4343* 
(0.2427) 
-0.0242 
(0.0319) 
Trade    -0.0101 
(.0264) 
0.0896 
(0.4380) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    0.0357 
(0.0337) 
Instruments 110 85 86 87 60 
Hansen 0.038 0.026 0.006 0.056 0.318 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.054 0.038 0.040 0.137 0.143 
2χ  768.62*** 610.76*** 533.40*** 366.56*** 130.66*** 
Observations 4157 3275 3216 2033 794 
Groups 179 170 168 166 85 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 6 – Two-Step Differences GMM Regression Estimates (FDI Inflows) 
 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.8053*** 
(0.0341) 
0.4909*** 
(0.0878) 
0.4211*** 
(0.1212) 
0.4070*** 
(0.1024) 
0.1745 
(0.1169) 
Democracy 0.1692 
(0.5749) 
-0.2076 
(0.4907) 
-0.9257 
(0.7197) 
-1.1185 
(0.7870) 
0.1173 
(0.6613) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 2.6730*** 
(0.7298) 
2.4883*** 
(0.8302) 
2.2989*** 
(0.6955) 
2.5082*** 
(0.8994) 
Growth   -0.0065 
(0.0305) 
-0.0081 
(0.0299) 
-0.0422 
(0.0322) 
Trade    0.5336* 
(.2838) 
0.4428 
(0.3531) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    0.0377 
(0.0330) 
Instruments 110 85 86 87 88 
Hansen 0.038 0.026 0.034 0.056 0.593 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
AR(2) 0.055 0.038 0.093 0.167 0.221 
2χ  633.79*** 457.44*** 255.93*** 250.08*** 106.16*** 
Observations 4157 3275 2061 2033 794 
Groups 179 170 167 166 85 
 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 7 – One-Step Differences GMM Regression Estimates(FDI % of GDP) 
 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.2222 
(0.1430) 
0.1057 
(0.1170) 
-0.0564 
(0.1021) 
-0.1398 
(0.1648) 
-0.2309 
(0.1601) 
Democracy 3.2257* 
(1.6959) 
-1.6401 
(2.2614) 
-20.4476** 
(9.4136) 
-13.6505 
(8.8077) 
0.4483 
(3.3282) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 9.7650 
(1.9757) 
12.9414* 
(7.0502) 
4.1912 
(3.7416) 
1.5894 
(5.1547) 
Growth   0.0908 
(0.1333) 
-0.0115 
(0.1040) 
-0.0517 
(0.1542) 
Trade    9.0330*** 
(2.2027) 
9.8823*** 
(3.6480) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    0.3621 
(0.3458) 
Instruments 110 85 86 87 88 
Hansen 0.024 0.029 0.227 0.060 0.538 
AR(1) 0.026 0.044 0.031 0.051 0.023 
AR(2) 0.886 0.544 0.842 0.556 0.307 
2χ  10.04*** 31.68*** 8.98*** 60.41*** 16.11*** 
Observations 4839 3861 2292 2251 887 
Groups 178 170 169 167 86 
 
 
 
 
 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 8 – Two-Step Differences GMM Regression Estimates (FDI % of GDP) 
 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.2270* 
(0.1415) 
0.1132 
(0.1172) 
-0.0520 
(0.1025) 
-0.1300 
(0.1683) 
-0.2304 
(0.1601) 
Democracy 2.5700* 
(1.4383) 
-1.3981 
(2.1648) 
-17.0310 
(12.2477) 
-11.3136 
(8.5382) 
0.4759 
(3.3376) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 8.5576*** 
(1.6104) 
11.4130** 
(5.7476) 
4.1746 
(3.1508) 
1.4896 
(5.0985) 
Growth   -0.0077 
(0.1021) 
-0.0418 
(0.1054) 
-0.0504 
(0.1460) 
Trade    7.8740*** 
(2.0079) 
9.8714*** 
(3.6130) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    0.4000 
(0.3884) 
Instruments 110 85 86 87 88 
Hansen 0.024 0.029 0.227 0.060 0.538 
AR(1) 0.048 0.056 0.178 0.217 0.377 
AR(2) 0.893 0.552 0.871 0.483 0.236 
2χ  10.39*** 32.75*** 7.69* 61.59*** 16.24*** 
Observations 4839 3861 2292 2251 887 
Groups 178 170 169 167 86 
 
 
 
 
 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 9 – One-Step System GMM Regression Estimates (FDI Inflows) 
 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.9941*** 
(0.0054) 
0.9899*** 
(0.0126) 
0.9868*** 
(0.0168) 
0.9999*** 
(0.0120) 
0.9431*** 
(0.1531) 
Democracy 0.5082*** 
(0.1886) 
-0.0093 
(0.1401) 
-0.1866 
(0.2009) 
-0.0206 
(0.2523) 
-0.0745 
(0.3336) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 0.0423 
(0.0346) 
0.0629*** 
(0.0496) 
0.0196 
(0.0557) 
0.0982 
(0.1057) 
Growth   0.0307 
(0.0268) 
0.0262 
(0.0275) 
0.0334 
(0.0316) 
Trade    0.0070 
(.0463) 
-0.0089 
(0.0498) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    0.0965* 
(0.0561) 
Instruments 180 143 138 139 131 
Hansen 0.000 0.000 0.393 0.428 0.998 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.056 0.028 0.055 0.080 0.182 
2χ  884075.64**
* 
3.69e^06*** 2.38e^06*** 2.38e^06*** 751871.03**
* 
Observations 4535 3586 2675 2636 1069 
Groups 180 172 170 168 88 
 
 
 
 
 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 10 – Two-Step System GMM Regression Estimates (FDI Inflows) 
 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.7969*** 
(0.0321) 
0.9915*** 
(0.0129) 
0.9886*** 
(0.0187) 
0.9977*** 
(0.0115) 
0.9497*** 
(0.0466) 
Democracy 0.1876 
(0.5291) 
-0.0240 
(0.1483) 
-0.1904 
(0.1861) 
-0.0243 
(0.2609) 
-0.0985 
(0.3393) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 0.0400 
(0.0360) 
0.0595*** 
(0.0528) 
0.0231 
(0.0510) 
0.0902 
(0.1108) 
Growth   0.0300 
(0.0241) 
0.0314 
(0.0251) 
0.0323 
(0.0335) 
Trade    0.0083 
(0.0400) 
-0.0082 
(0.0549) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    0.0882 
(0.0636) 
Instruments 180 143 138 139 131 
Hansen 0.449 0.128 0.393 0.428 0.998 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.056 0.027 0.054 0.079 0.183 
2χ  878604.91**
* 
3.06e^06*** 2.71e^06*** 2.31e^06*** 644494.79**
* 
Observations 4535 3586 2675 2636 1069 
Groups 180 172 170 168 88 
 
 
 
 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 11 – One-Step System GMM Regression Estimates (FDI % of GDP) 
 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.4432*** 
(0.1151) 
0.4223*** 
(0.1197) 
0.3042** 
(0.1312) 
0.4483*** 
(0.1317) 
0.2954** 
(0.1346) 
Democracy 3.5945*** 
(0.7727) 
0.7147 
(1.1183) 
1.2680 
(1.5341) 
5.8078*** 
(1.8018) 
1.2972 
(2.4396) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 0.1986* 
(0.1064) 
0.1703 
(0.1176) 
-1.5529*** 
(0.4693) 
-1.0186* 
(0.5742) 
Growth   0.5512** 
(0.2582) 
0.3103 
(0.2427) 
0.5583 
(0.4070) 
Trade    2.8093*** 
(.8194) 
3.6767*** 
(1.2015) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    -1.1285 
(0.8501) 
Instruments 181 143 138 139 133 
Hansen 0.538 0.146 0.148 0.273 1.000 
AR(1) 0.019 0.024 0.032 0.054 0.046 
AR(2) 0.627 0.665 0.258 0.220 0.668 
2χ  260.45*** 577.65*** 439.06*** 406.66*** 472.25*** 
Observations 5036 4040 2920 2868 1170 
Groups 178 171 170 168 88 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 12 – Two-Step System GMM Regression Estimates (FDI% of GDP) 
 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FDI 0.4432*** 
(0.1151) 
0.4222*** 
(0.1191) 
0.3065** 
(0.1324) 
0.4512*** 
(0.1311) 
0.2969** 
(0.1345) 
Democracy 3.5966*** 
(0.7751) 
0.6973 
(1.0544) 
1.2320 
(1.4701) 
5.7256*** 
(1.9849) 
1.2267 
(2.3335) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
 0.1971* 
(0.1016) 
0.1703 
(0.1131) 
-1.5540*** 
(0.4391) 
-1.0049* 
(0.5397) 
Growth   0.5422** 
(0.2657) 
0.2939 
(0.2015) 
0.5355 
(0.3712) 
Trade    2.8112*** 
(.7646) 
3.6721*** 
(1.1707) 
Exchange 
Rate 
    -1.1453 
(0.8266) 
Instruments 181 143 138 139 133 
Hansen 0.538 0.146 0.148 0.273 1.000 
AR(1) 0.028 0.033 0.074 0.086 0.157 
AR(2) 0.597 0.631 0.274 0.198 0.629 
2χ  261.96*** 562.92*** 517.39*** 349.46*** 441.49*** 
Observations 5036 4040 2920 2868 1170 
Groups 178 171 170 168 88 
 
 
 
 
 
***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 13 – List of Variables 
 
Variable Name Description Source 
FDI Inflows Net inflows of investment to 
acquire a lasting management 
interest in an enterprise in an 
economy other than of the 
investor. Sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital 
as shown in the balance of 
payments. In current dollars. 
World Development 
Indicators 
FDI % of GDP Divides new investment 
inflows less disinvestment in 
the reporting economy from 
foreign investors and is 
divided by GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators 
Democracy Classified as “1” for 
democracy, and “0” if not. 
Dictatorship-Democracy 
Dataset 
GDP Per Capita(PPP, 
constant) 
GDP converted to 
international dollars using 
purchasing power parity 
rates. Constant 2005 
international dollars. 
World Development 
Indicators 
Real GPP Per Capita 
Growth 
Aggregates are based on 
2005 U.S dollars. GDP per 
capita divided by midyear 
population. Annual 
percentage growth rate of 
GDP per capita based on a 
constant local currency. 
World Development 
Indicators 
Trade Openness Sum of exports and imports 
divided by GDP 
World Development 
Indicators 
Real Exchange Rate Nominal effective exchange 
rate( a measure of the value 
of a currency against a 
weighted average of several 
foreign currencies) divided 
by a price deflator or index of 
costs. 
World Development 
Indicators 
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Table 14 – List of Countries 
Afghanistan Chile Grenada Macedonia Poland Trinidad and Tobago 
Albania China Guatemala Madagascar Portugal Tunisia 
Algeria Colombia Guinea Malawi Qatar Turkey 
Angola Comoros Guinea-Bissau Malaysia Romania Turkmenistan 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Congo (Brazzaville, Republic of 
Congo) Guyana Maldives 
Russian 
Federation Uganda 
Argentina Costa Rica Haiti Mali Rwanda Ukraine 
Armenia Cote d'Ivoire Honduras Malta Samoa United Arab Emirates 
Australia Croatia Hungary Marshall Islands Saudi Arabia United Kingdom 
Austria Cuba Iceland Mauritania Senegal United States of America 
Azerbaijan Cyprus India Mauritius Serbia and Montenegro Uruguay 
Bahamas Czech Republic Indonesia Mexico Seychelles Uzbekistan 
Bahrain Czechoslovakia Iran 
Micronesia, 
Federated States 
of 
Sierra Leone Vanuatu 
Bangladesh Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire, Congo-Kinshasha) Iraq Moldova Singapore Venezuela 
Barbados Denmark Ireland Mongolia Solomon Islands Viet Nam 
Belarus Djibouti Israel Morocco Somalia Yemen Arab Republic 
Belgium Dominica Italy Mozambique South Africa Zambia 
Belize Dominican Republic Jamaica Myanmar South Korea Zimbabwe 
Benin Ecuador Japan Namibia Spain  Bhutan Egypt Jordan Nepal Sri Lanka  
Bolivia El Salvador Kazakhstan Netherlands St. Kitts and Nevis  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Equatorial Guinea Kenya New Zealand St. Lucia  
Botswana Eritrea Kiribati Nicaragua St. Vincent and the Grenadines  
Brazil Estonia Kuwait Niger Sudan  Brunei 
Darussalam Ethiopia Kyrgyzstan Nigeria Suriname  
Bulgaria Fiji Laos North Korea Swaziland  Burkina Faso Finland Latvia Norway Sweden  Burundi France Lebanon Pakistan Switzerland  Cambodia Gabon Lesotho Palau Syria  Cameroon Gambia Liberia Panama Tajikistan  
Canada Georgia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Papua New 
Guinea Tanzania  
Cape Verde Germany Liechtenstein Paraguay Thailand  Central 
African 
Republic 
Ghana Lithuania Peru Togo  
Chad Greece Luxembourg Philippines Tonga  
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment and Democracy 
Senior Capstone Project for Dario Castro 
- 15 - 
REFERENCES 
  Adam, A., & Filippaios, F. (2007). Foreign direct investment and civil liberties: A new 
perspective. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4), 1038-1052. 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an 
application to employment equations. The review of economic studies, 58(2), 277-297. 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components 
models. Journal of econometrics, 68(1), 29-51. 
Balasubramanyam, V. N., Salisu, M., & Sapsford, D. (1996). Foreign direct investment and growth in EP 
and IS countries. The Economic Journal, 92-105. 
Blomström, M., & Kokko, A. (1998). Multinational corporations and spillovers.Journal of Economic 
surveys, 12(3), 247-277. 
Blonigen, B. A. (2005). A review of the empirical literature on FDI determinants.Atlantic Economic 
Journal, 33(4), 383-403. 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models. Journal of econometrics, 87(1), 115-143. 
Blundell, R., Bond, S., & Windmeijer, F. (2001). Estimation in dynamic panel data models: improving on 
the performance of the standard GMM estimator(Vol. 15, pp. 53-91). Emerald Group  
Borensztein, E., De Gregorio, J., & Lee, J. W. (1998). How does foreign direct investment affect economic 
growth?. Journal of international Economics, 45(1), 115-135 
Busse, M. (2004). Transnational corporations and repression of political rights and civil liberties: An 
empirical analysis. Kyklos, 57(1), 45-65. 
Busse, M., & Hefeker, C. (2007). Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment. European journal 
of political economy, 23(2), 397-415. 
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public 
Choice, 143(1-2), 67-101. 
Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S., & Olson, M. (1996). Property and contract rights in autocracies and 
democracies. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2), 243-276. 
Dunning, J. H. (1991). The eclectic paradigm of international production. The Nature of the Transnational 
Firm, 121. 
Dunning, J. H. (1993). The globalization of business: The challenge of the 1990s (pp. 295-6). London: 
Routledge. 
Globerman, S., & Shapiro, D. (2002). Global foreign direct investment flows: The role of governance 
infrastructure. World development, 30(11), 1899-1919. 
Haggard, S. (1990). Authoritarianism and democracy: political institutions and economic growth revisited. 
Program on US-Japan Relations, Harvard University.Analysis. Journal of Politics, 68(1), 62-74. 
Foreign Direct Investment and Democracy 
Senior Capstone Project for Dario Castro 
- 16 - 
Hansen, L. P. (1982). Large sample properties of generalized method of moments 
estimators. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1029-1054. 
Harms, P., & Ursprung, H. W. (2002). Do civil and political repression really boost foreign direct 
investments?. Economic Inquiry, 40(4), 651-663. 
Haskel, J. E., Pereira, S. C., & Slaughter, M. J. (2007). Does inward foreign direct investment boost the 
productivity of domestic firms?. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(3), 482-496 
Helpman, E. (2006). Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms (No. w12091). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Henisz, W. J., & Williamson, O. E. (1999). Comparative economic organization—within and between 
countries. Business and Politics, 1(3), 261-278. 
Hobday, M. (1995). Innovation in East Asia: the challenge to Japan (p. 33). Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W., & Rosen, H. S. (1988). Estimating vector autoregressions with panel 
data. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1371-1395. 
Huntington, S. P., & Dominguez, J. I. (1975). Political development. Handbook of political science, 3, 1-
114. 
Jakobsen, J., & De Soysa, I. (2006). Do foreign investors punish democracy? Theory and empirics, 1984–
2001. Kyklos, 59(3), 383-410. 
Javorcik, B. S. (2004). Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms? In 
search of spillovers through backward linkages. The American Economic Review, 94(3), 605-627. 
Jensen, N. M. (2003). Democratic governance and multinational corporations: Political regimes and 
inflows of foreign direct investment. International Organization, 57(3), 587-616. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Zoido-Lobatón, P. (1999). Aggregating governance indicators (Vol. 2195). 
World Bank Publications. 
Keller, W., & Yeaple, S. R. (2003). Multinational enterprises, international trade, and productivity growth: 
firm-level evidence from the United States (No. w9504). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Li, Q. (2009). Democracy, autocracy, and expropriation of foreign direct investment. Comparative Political 
Studies, 42(8), 1098-1127. 
Li, Q., & Resnick, A. (2003). Reversal of fortunes: Democratic institutions and foreign direct investment 
inflows to developing countries. International organization, 57(1), 175-212. 
Limongi Neto, F. P., Cheibub, J. A., Alvarez, M. M., & Przeworski, A. (1996). What makes democracies 
endure?. Journal of democracy, 7(1), 39-55. 
Markusen, J. R., & Venables, A. J. (1998). Multinational firms and the new trade theory. Journal of 
international economics, 46(2), 183-203. 
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2002). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 
1800-2002. 
Foreign Direct Investment and Democracy 
Senior Capstone Project for Dario Castro 
- 17 - 
Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (2002). Polity IV dataset. Computer file. 
Milner, H. V., & Kubota, K. (2005). Why the move to free trade? Democracy and trade policy in the 
developing countries. International organization, 107-143. 
Moosa, I. A. (2002). Foreign direct investment. Palgrave. 
Moran, T. H. (1998). Foreign Direct Investment. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Noorbakhsh, F., Paloni, A., & Youssef, A. (2001). Human capital and FDI inflows to developing countries: 
New empirical evidence. World development,29(9), 1593-1610. 
Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. American Political Science Review, 87(03), 
567-576. 
Przeworski, A. (Ed.). (2000). Democracy and development: political institutions and well-being in the world, 
1950-1990 (Vol. 3). Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1993). Political regimes and economic growth.The journal of economic 
perspectives, 51-69. 
Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. C., & Manin, B. (Eds.). (1999). Democracy, accountability, and 
representation (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press. 
Rodrik, D. (1996). Why do more open economies have bigger governments?(No. w5537). National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Roodman, D. (2013). xtabond2: Stata module to extend xtabond dynamic panel data estimator. Statistical 
Software Components. 
Sargan, J. D. (1980). Some tests of dynamic specification for a single equation.Econometrica: Journal of 
the Econometric Society, 879-897. 
Srinivasan, T. N., & Bhagwati, J. N. (1999). Outward-orientation and development: are revisionists right?. 
UNCTAD, G. (2013). World investment report. 
Windmeijer, F. (2005). A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM 
estimators. Journal of econometrics, 126(1), 25-51. 
World Bank Group (Ed.). (2014). World Development Indicators 2014. World Bank Publications. 
Yang, B. (2007). Autocracy, democracy, and FDI inflows to the developing countries. International 
Economic Journal, 21(3), 419-439 
 
